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[1] In the face of global change, which is characterized by growing water demands and
increasingly variable water supplies, the equitable sharing of water and the drought
proofing of rural livelihoods will require an increasing physical capacity to store water.
This is especially true for the semiarid and dry subhumid regions of sub-Saharan Africa
and Asia. This paper addresses the following question: What criteria should
policymakers apply in choosing between centralized storage capacity in the form of
conventional large reservoirs and large interbasin water transfer schemes and
decentralized and distributed storage systems in the farmers’ fields and in
microwatersheds and villages (tanks, microdams, and aquifers)? This exploratory paper
uses an interdisciplinary framework encompassing the natural and social sciences to
develop four indicators that are considered critical for understanding the biochemical,
physical, economic, and sociopolitical dimensions of the scale issues underlying the
research question. These are the residence time of water in a reservoir, the water
provision capacity, the cost effectiveness of providing reliable access to water per
beneficiary, and the equity dimension: maximizing the number of beneficiaries and
compensating the losers. The procedural governance challenges associated with each
indicator are dealt with separately. It is concluded that water storage and the
institutional capacity to effectively administer it are recursively linked. This implies
that if the scale of new storage projects gradually increases, a society can progressively
learn and adapt to the increasing institutional complexity.
Citation: van der Zaag, P., and J. Gupta (2008), Scale issues in the governance of water storage projects, Water Resour. Res., 44,
W10417, doi:10.1029/2007WR006364.
1. Introduction
[2] Global fresh water supplies are limited and water
availability varies largely in space and time. Many people
still lack reliable access to adequate amounts of fresh water of
sufficient quality for domestic and productive purposes
[United Nations, 2005;World Water Assessment Programme
(WWAP), 2006]. Their access is constrained by the natural
spatial and temporal variability of rainfall and river flow,
which is likely to be further jeopardized because of the
impacts of climate change [Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2007]. Rising population levels, sustained
positive economic growth rates in many countries, strong
urbanization trends and recent calls for increased production
of biofuels are likely to significantly increase the demand for
water. This obviously will add to the pressures on water
resources in water stressed regions of the world [United
Nations Development Programme, 2007]. While water use
in excess of natural supply on an annual basis at present is
limited to small although densely populated regions of the
world, the seasonal challenges facing humans is much higher
[WWAP, 2006, p. 2]. In many parts of the world, water
availability is highly variable over time. Whereas on average
sufficient water may be available, periods of excess are
followed by periods of deficit. Shortages of water have not
only direct impacts on domestic requirements but also on
food production and other productive uses of water, whereby
often food production is the largest water consumer. Greater
rainfall variability is thus correlated with lower per capita
GDP [Brown and Lall, 2006]. Water storage is required to
buffer livelihoods and insure families, communities and
societies against shortages [cf. Dey et al., 2006] Such stores
of water transport water in time, from periods of excess to
periods of deficit [Keller et al., 2000;Grey and Sadoff, 2007].
[3] There is thus a need for innovative solutions to ensure
water security on a day-to-day basis globally and especially
within the semiarid areas of the developing world. While in
the 1960s and 1970s the focus of development cooperation
was on infrastructure, this was followed by a focus on
changing policies and governance patterns in the 1990s
[Meier, 2001;Wuyts, 2002; Pronk, 2001, 2003]. In the water
field this implied a shift away from constructing dams and
large hydraulic works to an emphasis on improved water
management and enhanced allocation and water use effi-
ciencies in the 1980s and 1990s [Pahl-Wostl, 2002, 2007].
The focus on improving governance processes was meant to
ensure that policymakers were empowered to make context
relevant choices. However, in situations where the physical
capability to control water flows and to buffer water systems
against increasing seasonal and annual variations in water
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availability is lacking, improving the water management
‘‘processes’’ has little or no impact. There is thus a renewed
emphasis on investments in physical interventions as
reflected in the new water resources strategy of the World
Bank [World Bank, 2004], which is a marked change com-
pared to its previous water management policy [World Bank,
1993]. Biophysical interventions that aim at increasing the
capacity to store water volumes will, if successful, enable
households, communities and societies to effectively cope
with the seasonal and annual variation in fresh water supplies
and enhance the resilience of their water systems to climate
shocks [Koudstaal et al., 1992; Savenije and van der Zaag,
2000; Shah and Van Koppen, 2006; Grey and Sadoff, 2007]
(see also M. Moench and S. Stapleton, Water, climate, risk
and adaptation, unpublished working paper, Cooperative
Programme on Water and Climate, 2007, available at http://
www.climate-transitions.org/node/748). This may form a
‘‘tipping point’’ that will enable rural people to lift them-
selves out of the poverty trap [Swallow et al., 2006]. This
paper attempts to contribute to the identification of some
criteria that will help policymakers make such choices.
[4] It is unclear whether additional storage capacity should
be centralized in the form of conventional large reservoirs
and large interbasin water transfer schemes, or decentralized
and distributed in the farmers’ fields and at the level of the
microwatershed and village or some combination of these
two extremes. The policy choice between developing cen-
tralized and distributed water storage therefore requires
critical analysis. Such analysis needs to take into account
that the choice will be highly contextual in character and
needs to be made on the basis of clear criteria. We assume
first, that there is need for enlarging the number of benefi-
ciaries as opposed to enlarging water storage per se or the
profits from such water storage. Second, we focus on a set of
indicators that could assist national policymakers in decision
making (see section 3). Third, the institutional and physical
complexity of each choice is dealt with separately (section 6).
[5] While water buffers can take different shapes and
forms, biophysical interventions normally have nonphysical
ramifications, including social consequences and implica-
tions for governance. These nonphysical implications are
assumed to be nonlinearly related to the size of the storage
facility. The paper thus investigates the key criteria policy-
makers may use to determine the preferred storage options
in a specific context: many small storage reservoirs distrib-
uted in the landscape or fewer larger reservoirs that are more
centrally managed, whereby both options may have large
externalities.
[6] Although domestic use is the most vital and often
given the highest priority in global policy making such as
reflected in the Millennium Development Goals, it requires
relatively small amounts of water; i.e., between 20 and
150 L of water per person per day. By far the largest water
user (i.e., about 70% world wide) is agriculture. We there-
fore focus on agricultural water use, with the understanding
that stored water often has multiple uses, and that it may also
serve domestic needs or animal husbandry and other pro-
ductive purposes [Van Koppen et al., 2006]. Whereas
municipal and industrial uses need relatively high levels of
storage because of the higher levels of supply assurance
required, these sectors normally have a much higher ability
to pay compared to the agricultural sector, which explains
that these sectors normally have fewer problems securing
access to such storage capacity [Savenije and van der Zaag,
2002]. Although water can be stored in the unsaturated zone
as soil moisture, or deeper down in aquifers, this paper
focuses on small and large surface reservoirs, despite the
potential advantages of the former [see, e.g., Falkenmark
and Rockstro¨m, 2004]. Further, it focuses on the semiarid
and dry subhumid regions of the developing world. In
Africa and Asia alone this would affect the livelihoods of
100 million rural families (implying a total population of
about 600 million). Improving their access to reliable
sources of water for productive purposes has a high
economic and social benefit [Rijsberman, 2004] and can
lead to sustainable development. This creates a strong
social bias in our indicators toward focusing on the
number of beneficiaries of such storage systems, as op-
posed to the amount of water stored or the economic
productivity generated.
[7] In order to address the research question, we develop
a coherent framework. The starting point is elaborating on
the concept of sustainable development [World Commission
on Environment and Development, 1987; Beg et al., 2002;
Cohen et al., 1998; Banuri et al., 2001; Markandya and
Halsnæs, 2002], which conventionally consists of three
pillars, namely, the economics, social and ecological pillars
[cf. Hildering, 2004]. This incompletely represents the
natural system side of the sustainable development concept.
In our extended framework, we incorporate the natural
system dimensions and include biochemical and physical
processes. Various authors, river ecologists in particular,
have described how physical and chemical disturbances
not only affect ecological systems [Hildrew and Giller,
1994; Resh et al., 1988] but may be constituent parts of
such systems [e.g., McClain et al., 2003]. We thus
propose an hourglass image that posits the natural system
and social system aspects as two complementary dimen-
sions of sustainable development with the ecological
Figure 1. The hourglass representation of sustainable
development.
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component being common to both (Figure 1). Criteria that
fit each of the key aspects of the hourglass representation of
sustainable development are presented, although we did
not look explicitly for ecological criteria, since this was
implicitly taken into account in the economic, social,
biochemical and physical dimensions.
[8] This exploratory paper first introduces some basic
aspects of water storage (section 2). It provides a brief
theoretical discussion of scale from the natural and social
science perspectives (section 3) to elicit criteria for
evaluating the two policy options (section 4). It compares
the small and large storage options (section 5) and
discusses the complementary institutional structure needed
to deal with this (section 6). Finally, it assesses these
options and concludes that increasing access to water
storage requires investments, triggers economic growth
but may also generate negative social and ecological
externalities, in particular in the case of large reservoirs.
The institutional capacity of societies to effectively deal
with these effects may be as much a result of developing
storage projects as a prerequisite. This conclusion seems to
imply that the scale of new storage projects could gradu-
ally increase so that a society can progressively learn and
adapt to the increasing institutional complexity it faces
(section 7).
2. Water Storage
[9] Before moving further it is relevant to briefly list the
various available water storage options. Table 1 provides an
overview of different types of water storage, by distinguish-
ing the source of water (capturing rainfall directly, or captur-
ing surface water) and medium of storage (a container like a
tank or a surface reservoir, the unsaturated zone of the soil
(the upper layer of the soil), and the saturated zone (deeper
underground in aquifers)).
[10] The type of water use (domestic, animal husbandry,
arable agriculture, and other productive purposes such as for
industry, cooling water for energy installations, and the
service sector) is frequently related to the source of water
and the medium of storage, such as rainwater harvesting to
enhance soil moisture (agriculture), and the collection of
water from rooftops (domestic).
[11] Any surface reservoir system whether large, medium
or small divides a catchment area into three distinct parts,
and thereby also pushes its residents into three distinct roles
(Figure 2).
Table 1. Different Types of Water Storage
Storage Medium
Water Source
Rainfall Surface Water
Unsaturated zone Rainwater harvesting through plant spacing,
plowing along the contour, ridges and bunds,
and terracing
Runoff harvesting from adjacent uncultivated
plots, compound areas, roofs,
and roads directly onto cropped fields
Saturated zone Aquifer storage of seepage ‘‘losses’’
from impoundments
Aquifer storage from artificial recharge;
sand dams
Container Runoff harvesting from adjacent uncultivated plots,
compound areas, roofs, and roads into a pond,
tank, or reservoir
Impounding river flow in small, medium,
and large reservoirs, both in stream and
off channel
Figure 2. A reservoir divides a catchment area into three parts and its residents into distinct roles.
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[12] 1. Upstream of the reservoir is the catchment area
which generates the surface water that will flow into the
dam. The owners or land users in this area, and those
displaced by the reservoir itself, will not (directly) benefit
from the reservoir but their actions may be constrained
by the needs of the reservoir. Since they provide a service to
the reservoir they could be considered the ‘‘benefactors’’ of
the reservoir. The number of benefactors in a storage project
will be denoted by nb.
[13] 2. The center is formed by the command area of the
reservoir, which receives water from it, and whose owners
are supposed to directly benefit. They can therefore be
considered the ‘‘direct recipients,’’ denoted by ndr.
[14] 3. Those located further downstream find themselves
at the receiving end and feel the consequences of whatever
has occurred upstream. They may thus be considered the
‘‘indirect recipients’’: they are not intended to directly
benefit from the reservoir but may feel its impact because
of a changed hydrological regime; this impact may be
beneficial or harmful. The number of indirect recipients is
denoted by nir.
[15] In any decision on a new water storage project, there
will also be other stakeholders involved apart from the
residents in the area. These include distant actors who have
the power and/or interest in improving the water facilities in
the area (e.g., those who invest; those who wish to purchase
the products produced from the use of such water for further
marketing; those who want to deal with general poverty
reduction strategies for the country, etc.); and those who fear
that the project may have negative repercussions that resonate
beyond the catchment (e.g., NGOs concerned with the
environmental consequences on a biotope in the catchment
that provides the habitat for unique species). This paper
explores whether there is a fundamental difference between
smaller and larger reservoirs, with respect to their socioeco-
nomic as well as ecological and political effects, taking the
four categories of actors identified above into account.
3. Some Theoretical Considerations on Scale
[16] A common theoretical framework for assessing dif-
ferent water storage option is developed around the concept
of scale. Scale is an analytical ruler against which one can
measure [Gibson et al., 2000; Institutional Dimensions of
Global Environmental Change, 1999, 2005; Young, 2002].
In environmental and water related issues relevant scales
include the spatial scale, the time scale, the resource scale
[Gupta and van der Zaag, 2008] and the scale of
governance [Gupta, 2007b, 2008]. Levels are points along
each scale. Scaling up and down is the process of moving
up and down levels within scales. Cross-scale interactions
refer to movements or relationships between different
scales. Cross-scale interactions would pose fewer chal-
lenges if scales were in general involving linear processes.
However, since many of the processes involved in water
and environmental management are nonlinear, this means
that upscaling and downscaling (increasing or decreasing
the temporal and/or spatial level) of interventions may have
unanticipated results.
3.1. Scale Issues in the Natural Sciences
[17] Many hydrological processes are nonlinear, an ex-
ample being the sudden transition between laminar and
turbulent flow of water. Many processes are determined
by thresholds, such as the partitioning of rainfall into
interception, surface runoff, infiltration and evaporation:
rainfall below a certain value will only result in interception
losses and will not generate surface runoff [Savenije, 2004].
Increasing the intensity of rainfall radically changes the
proportions in which the water is partitioned. Such
nonlinear processes exist in space and time. This means
that observations made at a certain level cannot automati-
cally be deduced from observations made at other levels,
and thus that extrapolating data sets is not unproblematic.
For example, soil loss measured from a 10 m2 trial plot may
not be multiplied by a factor 1,000 to estimate the net soil
loss from a 1 ha field, or by a million for a 1,000 ha
watershed. This is because at the (1,000) hectare level some
redeposition of soil particles within field (watershed) may
occur [Bagayoko, 2006]. Swallow et al. [2002] call these
areas of deposition ‘‘filters.’’ Similarly, hydrological
processes at the plant level (1 m2) are dominated by
discontinuities within the topsoil, such as absence or
presence of cracks and root systems of plants, which
determine the magnitude of preferential water flow patterns.
These discontinuities make it difficult to adequately model
micro processes. At a larger spatial level, however, such
processes are often much easier to estimate as some of the
discontinuities may be averaged. At this level other
processes dominate [Uhlenbrook, 2006].
[18] At increasing spatial and temporal levels the inter-
actions between the various parts may give rise to new,
emergent, phenomena. This is probably the major reason
why upscaling and downscaling is problematic. One could
argue that in trying to upscale or downscale biophysical
processes, the systemic properties of those processes come
to light. Sometimes the emergent phenomenon is that of
self-similarity and self-organization, whereby the processes
occurring at smaller spatial or temporal levels are repeated
at a larger scale. The shape and form of river channels and
alluvial estuaries, for example, may not always be surpris-
ing [Savenije, 2003], as is the dendrical shape of some rivers
that is repeated at various levels. These may be considered
fractals [Rodrı´guez-Iturbe and Rinaldo, 2002]. Here the
large temporal dimension (millennia) has shaped the spatial
dimension (features of the landscapes) leading to a certain
dynamic balance between various biophysical processes
which give rise to certain coherent forms but not to a static
equilibrium.
[19] The above implies that a certain physical interven-
tion in the landscape at a given level that causes a small
disturbance of certain biophysical processes, could cause a
disproportionate (or negligible) disturbance at another. Sim-
ilarly, such an intervention could yield large benefits if
appropriately scaled and small at other levels.
3.2. Scale Issues in the Social Sciences
[20] Within the social sciences different disciplines deal
with scale differently. There is however a growing conver-
gence that there is neither an optimal scale nor an optimal
level at which environmental and water related issues can be
managed. There are no ‘‘objective’’ criteria that can help
determine what this optimal level is. There are however a
range of criteria and arguments that can be used to scale up
or scale down a problem and solution [Gupta, 2007a].
Examples of reasoning given to scale up a problem include
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the need to take into account externalities, to make policies
cost effective, to promote the common good, to gain
control, or to bypass other government agencies. There are a
number of reasons for scaling down; sometimes it is to
understand local causes, patterns and interests and the desire
to improve the resolution of the solution; or the need to both
mobilize and empower local actors to address their own
problems. There may also be other reasons for downscaling:
sometimes to transfer responsibility, avoid liability for
externalized effects, to protect local actors, to implement
budget cuts of central governments and/or to bypass the
nation state [Gupta, 2007b].
[21] This implies that actors are often making conscious
choices about which sets of reasoning they would like to use
to argue whether a particular scale or a particular level
should be used. Thus, economists often tend to focus on the
resource scale and argue in terms of economies of scale.
This would imply a choice in favor of relatively large
storage works in the area of water. Policymakers may tend
to focus on the administrative/jurisdictional scale and focus
on guiding principles such as subsidiarity and decentraliza-
tion which focus on empowering local actors to address
their own problems. Subsidiarity is the policy principle
adopted primarily within the European Union that focuses
on transferring certain powers and responsibilities to the
lowest appropriate policy level. Decentralized governance
systems are often supposed to enhance legitimacy by
including a larger number of stakeholders and their context
relevant knowledge. Such systems are expected to have a
higher compliance pull since a larger number of local actors
are involved in the decision-making process. However, in
practice this may not always be the case. Policies of
decentralization are often linked to neoliberal reforms such
as trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization that
started in the 1980s [Nuyten, 2004]. Such reforms imply a
shifting role of government in development processes: from
state-led development toward the strengthening of both civil
society and the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of the market. This type of
discourse may obscure the highly political content of such
reforms [Shore and Wright, 1997]. The danger is, that
decentralized democratization may lead to ‘‘decentralized
despotism’’ [Mamdani, 1996], especially in countries where
large power differences exist.
[22] In the context of water resources management there
are at least four aspects that further complicate processes of
decentralization. The first is that the new watershed and
catchment institutions that are being established in many
countries often are too weak to withstand their ‘‘capture’’ by
local elites [see Waalewijn et al., 2005]. The second is that
these new institutions often compete with already estab-
lished local government institutions at the District level and
may debilitate them [van der Zaag, 2005]. The mismatch
between administrative and hydrological boundaries has
thus added significantly to institutional complexity. The
third problem is that the subsidiarity concept in water
resources management, as with many other environmental
and resource management issues, tends to be a hollow
promise. As more and more externalized causes and impacts
are to be taken into account, decision making is ‘‘naturally’’
concentrated again at higher levels of authority, since
certain decisions (e.g., concerning the allocation of scarce
water; enforcement of water quality regulations) cannot be
left to local stakeholders alone. Moves toward harmoniza-
tion of policy and integration with other policy areas also
lead to scaling up of decision making to higher levels. The
fourth problem is that processes of decentralization often
fail to allocate adequate resources and capacity to those
levels with new responsibilities. The key message is that in
the social sciences, scaling is seen as a highly political
activity; a tool used by different actors to promote their own
interests. This implies that scale and level related choices
can never be isolated from the context in which they are
made and that such choices are never ‘‘objective’’ but
constructed on the basis of perception.
4. Indicators for Assessment
[23] This section elaborates on an appropriate set of
indicators to evaluate whether water storage should be
large or small and dispersed to fit each corner of the
hourglass model of sustainable development. For the
physical aspect, a useful indicator is the residence time
Tr of a water particle in the reservoir, which is the quotient
of the storage capacity and the average amount of water
flowing into the reservoir. If the water flow is expressed as
the mean annual runoff, then the residence time would
have as its unit year. Many reservoirs have residence times
in the range of 0.2–2 years [Vo¨ro¨smarty et al., 1997].
Residence time is an intriguing indicator. It expresses the
claim a storage project makes into the future, as a kind of
temporal footprint. It also expresses in a temporal unit its
spatial dependency and area of influence. The larger the
residence time of a reservoir, the greater its dependence on
the water resources generated in the upstream catchment
area, and the larger the impacted area downstream [cf.
Vo¨ro¨smarty et al., 1997]. It could further be argued that the
larger the residence time of a reservoir, the larger the
disturbance of the natural flow regime, and thus its
environmental impact.
[24] Water withdrawals for irrigation in semiarid climates,
characterized by distinct wet and dry seasons, alter a river’s
natural hydrological regime. As the need for irrigation water
is highest during the dry season, the base flow is first
captured. In order to augment water availability during the
dry season reservoirs are built that capture runoff water
during the wet season. As a result, first the base flow rapidly
decreases (Figure 3a), after which small flood flows that
would normally occur every second or third year occur
much less frequently as these flows are absorbed by the
reservoir (Figure 3b). Note that both processes are nonlin-
ear. Note further that shutting out small floods has large
ecological as well as socioeconomic consequences. Figure 3b
shows that this latter phenomenon appears to be S shaped:
beyond a certain residence time a reservoir, and the water
withdrawals related to it, becomes the dominating factor in a
river’s hydrology, and starts to create significant and mea-
surable upstream-downstream interdependencies. In the
example given, this turning point occurs when the reservoir
has a residence time of some 0.3–0.5 years; i.e., when it can
capture 30–50% of the annual natural flow. The value of
this critical residence time differs for different flow regimes,
and for different levels of reliable water supply.
[25] The residence time of a reservoir is typically related
to its function. If its function is to satisfy the requirements of
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a city’s water supply, high levels of reliability (higher than
95%) are required and in semiarid environments, over-year
storage is the norm (large storage capacity enables long-
term buffering), which necessarily translates into large
residence times. Full-scale irrigation would require large
amounts of water supplied at much lower levels of assur-
ance (75–90%) [Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002],
whereas for supplementary irrigation water storage aims
to bridge short periods of dry spells, and reservoirs for the
latter typically refill more than once during the rainy season,
implying relatively short residence times. The example
given in Figure 3 is based on agricultural water use
(irrigation) supplied at a reliability of 80%.
[26] For the biochemical aspect, we use an indicator
specific for agricultural water use. This is the water provi-
sion capacity W expressed as the depth of water layer (m),
which is the storage capacity S divided by the command
area of the reservoir (irrigated farm area) Af. A value in the
range of 0.1–0.2 m would indicate that the reservoir may
provide supplementary irrigation water only [van der
Zaag, 2007a; see also Rockstro¨m et al., 2003, 2007] or
that it is used as a balancing weir or a night storage
reservoir, whereas values of 0.8–1.2 m and beyond
would be typical for conventional full-scale irrigation
during the dry season; given that net irrigation water
requirements of a full dry season crop range between 500
and 800 mm and irrigation efficiencies between 50 and
90% [see, e.g., Cakmak et al., 2004]. Values in between
(0.5–0.7 m) would be typical for schemes that are based
on the concept of protective or deficit irrigation, as found
in India and elsewhere, as well as for supplementary
irrigation of wet season rice crops. One may generalize to
state that the larger the water provision capacity of a
storage project, the larger the disturbance of the natural
flow regime and the larger its ecological impact.
[27] In relation to the economic aspect of sustainable
development, we focus on the cost effectiveness of achiev-
ing reliable access to a certain amount of water per
beneficiary Mdr, which is the total investment cost of the
storage projectMt divided by the number of direct recipients
ndr. This indicator has two functions: it leads to a focus on
the beneficiaries and it helps to estimate how much each
beneficiary would potentially have to invest in order to
obtain reliable access to water. The policymaker can decide
on the basis of this criterion whether the project is viable
and can be funded (in cash or kind) by the state, by the
direct beneficiaries themselves, or by other commercial or
noncommercial funding agencies.
[28] As the size of the resources needed grows bigger, the
lump sum investment required may often lead to complex
institutional relationships. In general, small distributed res-
ervoirs can be partially funded by small investments in cash
or kind by the direct beneficiaries, creating greater local
involvement and ownership and a greater incentive to
maintain these reservoirs. The establishment of large hy-
draulic works, however, often implies that local users get
caught in a complex web of relations with outside players,
be they government, financial institutions, non governmen-
tal organizations and private companies. The larger the
hydraulic work, the larger the investment required and the
more complex this web will become, including the entry of
foreign players on the scene [see, e.g., Gumbo and van der
Zaag, 2002]. The effect of increasing the investment of a
storage project on local users’ access to stored water is
complex and difficult to predict. It often results in limiting
or circumscribing the decision-making capacity of local
stakeholders, while those responsible for the investment
either want to maintain sociopolitical control or are
concerned with how the investment costs can be recovered
[e.g., Easter and Liu, 2007].
Figure 3. The relation between residence time of a reservoir upstream and downstream; impact (0,
negligible; 1, complete) is nonlinear. (a) Impact on base flow. (b) Impact on small flow floods. The
example is derived from the Mupfure River (a tributary of the Sanyati River, which forms part of the
Zambezi basin) in Zimbabwe on the basis of monthly discharge data covering a period of 21 years
(October 1969 to September 1990) as measured at gauging station C70 and naturalized by the Zimbabwe
Department of Water Development in 1998. The coefficient of variation of annual flow was 122%, and
the base flow index (average flow during the 3 driest months (June–August) divided by the average flow
during the 3 wettest months (January–March)) was 0.028; the upstream reservoir stored and withdrew
water for irrigation use, achieving an assurance of supply of exactly 80%.
6 of 14
W10417 VAN DER ZAAG AND GUPTA: SCALE ISSUES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF WATER W10417
[29] Above certain investment values, lock-in may set in.
Projects may become too complex, not only technologically
but also administratively, such that their planning horizons,
and useful life, are stretched far beyond the usual planning
periods of 5–10 years corresponding sometimes to the
periods of political parties in power. This implies that where
projects are very large, societies tend to make decisions
simply because the existence of such projects influences
the perceived decision space [Janssen and Scheffer, 2004;
Pahl-Wostl, 2002]. In such situations, the changed environ-
ment caused by such large projects may even be viewed as
having become part of that society’s habitat; the ecological
impact having been internalized.
[30] A key social principle is equity. ‘‘Equity as a legal
concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice’’ as the
International Court of Justice stated in the Tunisia versus
Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Report 1982 [Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 1982, p. 18]. Equity has an
intergenerational element and an intrageneration element.
Principle 2.1 of the International Law Association’s New
Delhi declaration on the law of sustainable development
explains the intrageneration element as: ‘‘the rights of all
peoples within the current generation of fair access to the
current generation’s entitlement to the Earth’s natural
resources’’ [United Nations General Assembly, 2002, p. 4].
As resources are limited, providing access often implies
that there are winners and losers, and equity also calls for
compensating the losers. In this context we interpret equity
as maximizing the number of beneficiaries while compen-
sating the losers. Note that this equity criterion also has an
institutional dimension, as it requires significant institu-
tional resources to implement effective compensation
mechanisms. We propose here as the social criterion an
indicator that could be coined the ‘‘normalized externality’’
En of a storage project, which is the number of all actors
involved in a storage project (both positively and negatively
affected) divided by the number of positively affected
actors. Here we could simplify the definition as being the
number of affected actors of a storage project (nb + ndr + nir)
divided by the number of direct recipients (ndr), assuming
that the benefactors and indirect recipients are all negatively
affected, which need not be the case.
[31] Assuming that there will always be at least one direct
recipient, the minimum value that the normalized external-
ity indicator can take is 1. At this value there are no losers,
the externalities are minimal and likewise the social and
institutional complexity of the project. With an increasing
value of En, for each direct recipient there will be an
increasing number of actors who are indirectly, and often
negatively, affected by the storage project, and the more
complex it will be to adequately compensate the losers such
that equity is restored.
[32] Distributed small reservoirs will in general have a
large number of beneficiaries. The impact of these small
reservoirs on the benefactors will be relatively small,
displacement will be minimal and the ecological and social
impacts downstream will also be quite small for each small
reservoir. However, as the size of the reservoir increases, the
number of benefactors and displaced people increases and
the ecological and social effects downstream will increase
substantially implying considerable numbers of losers who
have to be compensated.
[33] This section presented two indicators that encapsu-
late key biophysical dimensions of water storage, and two
indicators that reflect key socioeconomic dimensions of
water storage. (1) residence time Tr (average time a water
particle resides in the reservoir), (2) water provision
capacity W (gross water layer that a reservoir can supply
to its command area), (3) investment Mdr (investment cost
of providing reliable access to water per direct recipient),
and (4) normalized externality En (the number of positively
and negatively affected actors of a storage project divided
by the number of positively affected actors).
5. Centralized and Distributed Water Storage
[34] This paper compares two choices for the national
policymaker in semiarid and dry subhumid areas: one
centralized large-scale storage reservoir for full irrigation
and many small-scale storage structures distributed through-
out the catchment with a similar number of beneficiaries but
meant for supplementary irrigation (Figure 4). Table 2
presents typical values of design parameters of these two
alternative water storage options: 2,000 on-farm tanks with
a capacity of 500 m3 each and one large reservoir with a
capacity to store 50  106 m3 of water. The particular
characteristics of both options are explained below. For the
latter (centralized) case we used values derived from
Malano et al. [2004] and Cakmak et al. [2004], but for
the distributed case we had to infer values that were based
Figure 4. Different policy options: a centralized and a
decentralized approach.
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on published and unpublished sources of individual small
tanks. These data therefore need empirical verification.
5.1. Centralized Large Storage
[35] The centralized storage approach is one in which a
(small, medium or large) reservoir collects surface water
and farmers downstream of the dam can access the stored
water through an open canal or closed pipe system. This
option conforms with the conventional irrigation develop-
ment approach. Most existing irrigation developments are
designed for irrigating a dry season crop, which have net
irrigation requirements on the order of 500–800 mm/a,
leading to gross irrigation requirements of between 800
and 1,200 mm/a. (These same irrigation schemes also allow
for supplementary irrigation of a rain-fed crop, but the
additional water requirements involved normally do not
affect the design parameters in major ways, except perhaps
when supplementing the water requirements of a wet season
rice crop.) As a consequence, relatively large reservoirs are
needed, which displace people and valuable crop land and
require a relatively large catchment area from which water
is captured. Irrigation schemes differ in size from 5 to
10,000 ha and beyond (a global sample of 129 irrigation
schemes had a median size of 5,200 ha [see Malano et al.
[2004]), the smallest requiring a reservoir with a minimum
capacity on the order of 20,000–100,000 m3, and a
catchment area from which water is captured of some
20–100 ha, depending on the precipitation and runoff
patterns in a region. The largest reservoirs may have a
storage capacity of 50–100  106 m3 or more and would be
located on relatively larger rivers. Investments are typically
done by development (domestic, regional or international)
banks in conjunction with contributions by the government
as well as by the beneficiary households. However, the
latter may be very small.
[36] The gross benefits to each irrigator will normally be
significant. Because of the large volume of irrigation water
supplied the gross return per unit of irrigation water is
however low (in Table 2 we give a value of 0.05 U.S.$/m3).
Similarly, because of the large investments required the net
returns (after deducting annualized capital cost) will nor-
mally be very modest and sometimes even negative.
[37] The operational requirements of the centralized
options are often complex. First, reservoirs are normally
equipped with gates or other devices that can be opened
and closed. Since the stored water is supposed to benefit a
large number of beneficiaries, some implicit or explicit
arrangements regulate who decides when the gate is opened
and closed, and how the water will be allocated over the plots
in the command area. Second, maintenance, such as canal
repairs, desilting of canals and reservoirs, fencing etc. have to
be arranged. Third, given the size of the reservoir and its
hydrological, ecological, economic and social impact it is
possible that downstream actors, including those concerned
with the environment, would put forward certain demands on
whether the reservoir should be built and/or how the reservoir
should be operated. Upstream benefactors and especially
those displaced will demand some form of compensation, if
not oppose the construction of the dam. Fourth, the magni-
tude of the investment requirements for large reservoirs is
likely to be significant, and tends to have large power effects
[Adams, 1992; Reisner, 1993; McCully, 1996].
5.2. Many Small-Scale Storage Structures
[38] In the decentralized distributed approach [van der
Zaag, 2007a, 2007b; Liniger and Critchley, 2007; Moench
Table 2. Typical Design Parameters and Values of Tanks and Small and Larger Reservoir Systemsa
Aspect Unitb
Individual
Farm Tankc
Distributed
Tanks Systemd
Centralized
Reservoir Systeme
Number of units 1 2,000 1
Catchment area Ac 1,000 m
2 20 40,000 150,000
Runoff Q 1,000 m3/a 3 6,000 25,000
Reservoir storage capacity S 1,000 m3 0.5 1,000 50,000
Residence time TR = S/Q years 0.2 0.2 2.0
Presence of sluice gate/valve G no no yes
Command area Ac 1,000 m
2 5 10,000 25,000
Number of benefactors nb household 0 not known 8,000
Number of direct recipients nd household 1 2,000 2,000
Number of indirect recipients ni household 0 not known 6,000
Storage capacity per direct recipient Sd 1,000 m
3/hh 0.5 0.5 25
Farm area per direct recipient Af 1,000 m
2 5 5 12.5
Water provision capacity W = S/Ac m 0.1 0.1 2
Annual water use per beneficiary 1,000 m3/hh 1 1 12.5
Estimate of total investment cost Mt
f 1,000 U.S.$ 2 4,000 20,000
Unit investment cost U.S.$/m3 4 4 0.4
Investment per beneficiary Md = Mt/nd 1,000 U.S.$/hh 2 2 10
Sustainable gross return per beneficiary per year U.S.$/hh/a 150 150 600
Sustainable net return per beneficiary per year
at 5% capital cost; excluding externalities
U.S.$/hh/a 50 50 100
Sustainable gross return per m3 per year U.S.$/m3 0.15 0.15 0.05
aCf. Keller et al. [2000, Table 3].
bHere hh means household.
cTypical values are derived from tanks being constructed in South Africa in connection with the ‘‘water for food movement’’ of Ma Thsepo. Values are
consistent with data published by Falkenmark and Rockstro¨m [2004] and Rockstro¨m et al. [2003, 2007].
dData of the distributed tanks system are mainly inferred from the individual tanks.
eSee, e.g., Malano et al. [2004] and Cakmak et al. [2004].
fIncludes compensation for the loss of production from the area inundated by the reservoir and the cost of compensating displaced persons.
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and Stapleton, unpublished working paper, 2007], policy-
makers choose to provide access to additional water through
storage that is decentralized and distributed in the farmers’
fields (e.g., storing rainwater in the soil of nontilled or
ripped fields or fields that are ploughed along the contour or
on terraced fields, and ‘‘harvesting’’ runoff water by storing
it in small farm tanks), and at the level of the
microwatershed and village (microdams and aquifers).
[39] In many semiarid and dry subhumid savannah
zones rain-fed agriculture needs a water storage capacity
of around 200 mm [Rockstro¨m et al., 2003, 2007]. Note
that this capacity can be utilized more than once during one
growing season. Part of this capacity is in the soil profile but
many farmers have to make do with poor soils with low
water holding capacities that can only effectively store
around 100 mm. This means that additional storage capacity
is required on the order of 100 mm. A typical smallholder
plot of 0.5 ha thus requires 500 m3 of additional storage
capacity.
[40] Here we consider the option that each farm plot
would have its own small storage tank (50–500 m3) that
would drought proof (part of) the rain-fed crop, as well as
other domestic and productive uses of water of the farm
household. The tank would capture (‘‘harvest’’) surface
runoff from relatively small uncultivated catchment areas
(0.5–2 ha), including from roads and the farm compound.
The water could be hauled from the tank simply with a
bucket or using a small pump. The investment required is
partially done in kind (labor, locally available construction
materials by the farming household; other construction
materials, tools by an NGO), and partly in cash (projects
and training funded by governments, investors or donors).
This option is currently pursued, for example, in South
Africa (the ‘‘water for food movement’’ of Ma Thsepo and
the ‘‘war on hunger’’ program of the Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry) and Kenya.
[41] The gross benefits to a household equipped with a
tank will be much lower than those for a household with
access to full-scale irrigation. Because of the relatively
small volume of supplementary irrigation water used the
gross return per unit of water (in Table 2 we use a value of
0.15 U.S.$/m3) is higher than for the full-scale irrigation
alternative.
5.3. Comparing Both Storage Options
[42] We compare both storage options using the four
criteria defined in the previous section. The residence time
of both options differ fundamentally. Each tank captures on
the order of 20% of the surface water generated from a
small 2 ha catchment area (Tr = 0.2 years, see Table 2). The
2,000 tanks taken together as one system have the same
residence time, since it was assumed that each individual
tank had its own small catchment area. The large reservoir,
in contrast, captures all the surface water generated in a
15,000 ha catchment, with a residence time that is likely to
be on the order of 1 or more years. In our example we
arrived at Tr = 2 years. In the latter catchment area there
seems to be little place for small tanks, since all the surface
water is required to fill the large reservoir. It therefore lays a
strong claim on the water resources generated in the
upstream catchment. Any additional water capture and
withdrawal by other upstream actors directly competes with
the requirements of the large project downstream [cf. Duflo
and Pande, 2007]. Moreover, with the much larger
residence time also the downstream hydrological, ecologi-
cal, social and economic impacts are much greater. Because
of the shorter residence times of the small tanks, their claims
on the upstream catchment and the downstream impacts are
modest. Since rural landscapes normally consist of
cultivated areas interspersed with noncultivated areas, there
will be sufficient space to accommodate many such small
runoff harvesting structures.
[43] An important difference between the two storage
options is their water provision capacity, and indicates
whether water is used for supplementing rain-fed crops or
whether it is used for irrigating a crop during the dry
season. The former will increase water consumption by
100–200 mm per crop, whereas the latter by 600–1,000mm
per crop. In addition it should be noted that supplementary
irrigation water has a much larger productivity than irrigation
water for a fully irrigated crop (typically 2 kg of grain per m3
versus 0.5 kg of grain per m3 [Rijsberman, 2004; van der
Zaag, 2007a]). In water scarce landscapes it may therefore
be prudent to invest in supplementary irrigation for rain-fed
agriculture during the wet season combined with very small
market gardening during the dry season, rather than in
round-the-year irrigation (dry and wet season).
[44] The economic indicator would reveal that the cost
effectiveness of water storage per unit of water is much
higher in the large reservoir than in the small reservoir.
While a centralized system would cost around 20 million
USD (an indicative figure), the cost of 2,000 tanks would be
about 4 million USD. The investment per direct recipient
farm would be USD 2,000 in a distributed scheme and USD
10,000 for a centralized reservoir. Because the large reser-
voir will be able to provide greater access to water, the
economic returns per beneficiary may be higher as shown in
Table 2. In addition, a large-scale reservoir also has the
potential for electricity generation and can therefore create
additional benefits.
[45] The rules of access to water from a centralized water
reservoir, however, may be more complex as investors may
claim hydraulic property [Coward, 1986] and some of the
water users may be disenfranchised in terms of water
control. Moreover, in larger irrigation schemes some
irrigators, especially those located in the periphery, may
fail to access sufficient water to satisfy their requirements.
In contrast, the distributed reservoir option entails small
local contributions in cash and kind; and hence also a
commitment to maintain the reservoirs. Further, several
small reservoirs have the potential of meeting the water
needs of those located upstream of a potential large
reservoir. In other words, those upstream of a large reservoir
cannot easily get access to water unless they are able to
pump the water upstream; but small-scale reservoirs can be
implemented in the upstream parts of catchment areas and
can thus potentially reach a larger group of beneficiaries
without the need for pumping.
[46] Turning to the equity criterion which indicates the
number of affected actors per beneficiary, we find the
following. An individual small tank may benefit the farm
family. Its catchment area is likely to comprise lands owned/
used by the farm family itself, whereas the indirect impacts
of the tank are unlikely to be felt by downstream house-
holds. This means that the total number of involved actors
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of an individual tank project is 1, equal to the number of
beneficiaries. Hence for this project En = 1; that is, there are
hardly any externalities, equity is easily achieved and there
are no institutional complexities. The aggregate of 2,000
small tanks, however, gives a different result, since the
aggregate of many tanks must have some measurable
downstream impact. This impact is believed to be relatively
small but without detailed empirical research the precise
magnitude is unknown. For the sake of the argument we
here assume that a similar number of actors may feel the
effects downstream as there are direct recipients (nir = ndr),
but this assumption may overstate the impact. This means
that for the aggregated tanks option the normalized
externality En = 2: for each beneficiary there is one
negatively affected actor. For this option equity starts to
become an issue, as well as the institutional arrangements
required to mitigate externalities. Turning to the large
reservoir, it may rely on a catchment area occupied by farms
of between by 2,000–10,000 farm households, serving
1,000 to 5,000 direct recipients, while the impact down-
stream may be felt by 2,000 to 10,000 actors. It should be
noted that these numbers are indicative and will differ from
case to case. In this example the normalized externality
indicator would average En = 5: for each beneficiary there
are four other actors that are negatively impacted by the
project. Whereas the aggregate tank option may possibly
affect one household somewhere downstream for each
direct beneficiary, the large reservoir may impact some three
other households per direct recipient household, of whom
two may be located upstream and two others downstream.
[47] The normalized externality indicator, as a proxy for
the equity criterion, aims to maximize the number of
beneficiaries while compensating the losers. Since in our
example the distributed small-scale option has a smaller
command area, does not cause displacement of people and
has lower negative impacts immediately downstream, the
compensation element will be relatively small. The central-
ized large-scale option with a significant command area,
displaced upstream populations and negative ecological,
economic and social consequences downstream may imply
a large number of stakeholders who have to be compensated
for their losses. The institutional requirements are signifi-
cantly more complex than for the distributed tank option.
This finding is in accordance with Duflo and Pande [2007],
who reviewed the socioeconomic impact of dam develop-
ment in India, and found that the presence of a large dam
increased inequity: people located downstream typically
benefited from the presence of a dam, but poverty increased
in the vicinity of the dam. They thus found that the costs
and benefits associated with large dams are unequally
distributed, and that in India the institutional capacity is
apparently insufficient to mitigate those negative distribu-
tional effects or establish effective and fair compensation
arrangements.
[48] Two final nonlinear phenomena concerning reser-
voirs should be noted, namely those related to siltation and
Table 3. Indicators and Nonlinearities
Hourglass Indicator Explanation Nonlinearities Procedural Implications
Physical Residence time Tr Average time for a reservoir
to fill (year)
Beyond a certain residence time a
reservoir becomes the dominating
factor within its area of influence
and may have higher environmental
impacts.
With larger impacts licensing
procedures become important
and environment impact
assessments have to be
carried out.
Bio-chemical Water provision
capacity W
Capacity to fulfill specific
water need (m water layer)
If the water provision capacity shifts
from supplementing rain-fed
agriculture to full dry season
irrigation, downstream impacts on
the flow regime will increase
significantly; impacts change with
project size, often harmless or even
beneficial when small but harmful
as size increases.
As projects increase in size,
they cross jurisdictions,
making the administrative
processes more cumbersome.
Economic Cost effectiveness of
reliable access to
water per
beneficiary Md
The degree of
resources invested
(U.S.$ per beneficiary)
Small investments may not lead to
change; larger investments may be
more cost effective; still larger
investments may lead to lock in
and large environmental changes.
As investments increase, more
extralocal actors get involved, which
may lead to change in rules of access.
With increased access to water,
households, communities, and
societies may lift themselves out of
the poverty trap.
Increased investments tend to
be accompanied by heightened
political interest and
involvement and lead to
more complex decision-making
processes. If increased costs
lead to public-private
partnerships that involve
nonnationals, international
commercial and investment
law rules become applicable.
Social Normalized
externality En
Maximizing the number of
beneficiaries while
compensating the losers
(number of all affected
actors divided by the
number of positively
affected actors)
Smaller projects tend to have fewer losers,
as the command area is smaller and the
ecological and social impacts
downstream are lower. The tradeoffs
are easier to deal with. Beyond a certain
size, the number of losers may compete
with the number of beneficiaries and
make the net benefit difficult to assess.
As projects increase in size,
more competing claims and
interests get involved, which
need to be reconciled.
This puts an increasing burden
on institutional capacity for
legitimate decision-making
processes and effective
compensation schemes.
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evaporation. The small tanks and reservoirs meant for
supplementary irrigation have low residence times, meaning
they may fill several times per season and hence silt up
relatively fast. This puts a strain on maintenance needs. The
extreme case is sand storage dams which are purposely built
to silt up and store water underground, so that evaporation
losses are reduced [see, e.g., Lasage et al., 2008]. As to
open water evaporation: this constitutes a relatively large
portion of the water losses incurred by small reservoirs. The
larger the reservoir, the larger the average depth and the
smaller the evaporation losses relative to the amount of
water stored. The large reservoir option is in this respect
superior to the distributed small-scale alternative. However,
this aspect should not be exaggerated: small reservoirs tend
to have small residence times and thus fall dry during large
parts of the dry season, minimizing evaporation losses and
possibly increasing seepage losses that are not prone to
evaporation. A precise comparison of evaporation losses for
both development scenarios should therefore be subject of
detailed quantitative research.
6. Discussion
[49] We identified four relatively straightforward indica-
tors to identify scaling effects in storage projects. These are
residence time Tr, water provision capacity W, the invest-
ment cost per direct recipient Md, and the normalized
externality En. These indicators hold hydrological, engi-
neering, agronomic and social information and in their
combination also contain ecological information. They
define and link different scales, each of which has certain
degrees of nonlinearity, and as these nonlinearities are not
necessarily symmetric, their combined effects in terms of
management requirements and governance may be difficult
to predict. Table 3 summarizes the major nonlinear
processes that these four indicators refer to, and discusses
the procedural implications of the different choices.
[50] Good governance calls, among others, for transpar-
ency, accountability and participation in decision making.
Such participatory decision making calls for taking into
account the way in which all direct and indirect stakeholders
may be affected by the decision-making process. As the size
of a storage reservoir is enlarged more actors are affected.
Some of these are beneficiaries (direct recipients ndr and
some indirect recipients), others may be negatively
impacted (some of the benefactors whose degrees of
freedom are constrained because of the storage project,
and those indirect recipients who are impacted negatively
by it), while still others are involved in funding and
designing the project. However, the roles and interests of
these actors differ. With increasing storage volume, more
people are likely to be impacted and the number of potential
tradeoffs and conflicts increases and finding an equitable
solution becomes more complex. The decision challenge for
the policymaker is to reconcile the differing interests by
enlarging the number of beneficiaries and finding some
means to compensate the losers and to see which of the two
options is easier to implement.
[51] Larger reservoirs thus require increasing institutional
capacity to design and implement decision-making process-
es that are perceived as fair and legitimate, and that lead to
outcomes that will be acceptable and enforceable. Larger
reservoirs call for greater scientific and technical capacity.
Environmental impacts change with project size and the
larger the project the greater the need for environment
impact assessments. A large number of small dams also
require considerable institutional capacity but of a different
nature; focused on capacity building at local level, provid-
ing access to loans at local level and organizing such a
process in a decentralized manner. It is difficult to compare
the administrative burden of one large intervention with
many small, but some elements are clear. The administrative
burden increases with size, especially when larger impacts
will require certain licensing procedures. As these impacts
cross jurisdictions new administrative complexities are
added. Finally, if a reservoir requires investments that go
beyond the capacity of the direct recipients, these benefi-
ciaries may get involved into new relations with outside
financiers. If foreign investors become involved, water
governance becomes subject to bilateral investment treaties
and international contract law [Schouten and Schwartz,
2006].
[52] The analysis may appear to tend toward the ‘‘small is
beautiful’’ and is perhaps a reaction to the era of large dams
and the outcry against them [e.g., Morse and Berger, 1992;
McCully, 1996]. However, the cumulative effect of very
many cascading tanks and small reservoirs spread across the
landscapes, in terms of hydrology, ecology and governance
are difficult to predict because of the scale effects discussed
above and should be an urgent field of research. To
exaggerate the point a bit: by now we have a fairly good
idea of what the biophysical, economic, managerial and
sociopolitical impacts are of a large dam with a capacity of,
say, two hundred million cubic meters [World Commission
on Dams, 2000]; yet we do not know the precise impacts
and effects of one million small tanks with a storage
capacity of two hundred cubic meters each.
[53] One could argue that the distributed approach of
upscaling storage would result in a better spread of access to
storage space, and is less easily monopolized as in the case
of large reservoirs. In terms of water allocation at the basin
level, however, the distributed approach poses nightmarish
challenges: would it still be possible (physically and ad-
ministratively) to release stored water in upstream catch-
ments to satisfy legitimate needs in downstream parts of the
basin? The answer hinges on the precise hydrological
impact of such an approach, which depends on the average
residence time of each of these small structures, which part
of the hydrograph is captured by it, and to what extent water
is used for full dry season irrigation.
7. Conclusion
[54] As climate change becomes a greater threat to
countries in terms of impacts on irrigation water systems
[Fischer et al., 2007], all countries, and especially those
with semiarid climates, need to think more about how best
to manage and store their water resources. Adaptation to
global change requires not only changes in the ways we
manage water, but also requires new judicious physical
interventions, in particular in creating more water storage
capacity.
[55] The policy choice is what form the additional storage
should take: should the centralized option be preferred with
relatively few large reservoirs, or the distributed option with
many small reservoirs and tanks, or judicious combinations
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thereof. This paper presented the graphic representation of
the hourglass model of sustainable development and iden-
tified four multidisciplinary criteria for evaluating policy
options on a case by case basis. In general, we can conclude
that the distributed approach has many advantages, in terms
of encouraging investment in cash and kind and local stakes
in the project, management and environmental aspects, yet
expressed per unit storage it is much more expensive in
monetary terms than the centralized option, although the
latter involves greater negative externalities that are likely to
be excluded from cost-benefits considerations.
[56] Whatever option is chosen, water storage capacity is
seen as an asset; and should as such feature in the annual
National Income and Production Accounts of all semiarid
countries [cf. Clarke and Islam, 2006; Lange, 1998; Lange
et al., 2003]. The average cost of creating 1 m3 of storage
ranges between 0.2 and 4 U.S.$/m3 (see Table 2). If as a
minimum 700 m3/capita is required, emulating South Africa
and Zimbabwe [see, e.g., Chimowa and Nugent, 1993], this
would translate into an investment requirement of 140 to
2,800 U.S.$/capita, figures that are in the same order of
magnitude as 1 year GDP of many developing countries
located in semiarid regions. This shows the immensity of
the challenge.
[57] There are complexities associated with large reser-
voirs that may be difficult to overcome and that require
strong institutional capacity if unwanted consequences, such
as unequal access and environmental impacts, are to be
mitigated. One would thus have to judge whether this
institutional capacity is such a scarce resource and so
difficult to build up that for the time being priority should
be directed to those storage projects that minimize institu-
tional complexity. This would favor the distributed ap-
proach that would create very many small, but per unit
storage more expensive, tanks and small reservoirs. Such an
approach could incrementally move toward comprehensive
coverage of the semiarid agricultural region.
[58] Such tanks and small reservoirs will increase the
insurance of livelihoods against dry spells. These would
significantly increase the water value through slowing the
water flow in the landscape, while having a limited negative
impact on upstream and downstream areas. In addition, the
managerial requirements of operating those storage struc-
tures would be limited compared to larger reservoirs. In
terms of managing the entire catchment in which these
structures would be located, the precise governance require-
ments are unknown, but must be limited because only a
relatively small portion of the generated runoff would be
captured and withdrawn. A positive externality of the small
reservoirs would be seepage losses that would recharge
aquifers on which those and neighboring farmers would rely
and benefit from. Having sources of water scattered across
the landscape may also have other benefits, as more water is
available for other, high-value productive uses.
[59] Once water availability is significantly enhanced and
secured, farmers will be more confident in harvesting a
good crop, and thus can afford to invest in improving their
agricultural technique likely to lead to doubling or even
tripling of crop yields [Rockstro¨m et al., 2003; Falkenmark
and Rockstro¨m, 2004; Falkenmark and Lannerstad, 2005].
[60] Empirical analysis in a number of different fields
shows that it is not always the size of the project that
guarantees its success, but the way it is embedded and
integrated in the local community that often ensures that
such a project is successful. For example, in the area of rural
electricity, even small rural electricity schemes may be
successful if they are well integrated into a larger rural
development plan that stimulates not just consumptive use
but also productive use of the electricity leading to the
generation of resources to make the whole scheme viable
[Ranganathan, 1993]. Swallow et al. [2006] emphasize that
success at one scale increases the return on investment at
other scales. They therefore make a case of the need for
concerted efforts at various spatial scales simultaneously.
[61] Increased access to water storage will, if properly
combined with investments in other fields, such as road
infrastructure, markets, knowledge and information, trigger
economic growth. Such a development may in turn require a
further increase in buffering capacity, and thus the creation
of more hydraulic ownership. With such investments the
dangers of inequity loom large. The institutional capacity of
governments to mitigate these effects and to provide for
public good functions, and to defend the public interests
must therefore be considered key. But ironically institutional
capacity may as much be a result of this development as a
prerequisite. This conclusion seems to imply that the scale
of new storage projects could gradually increase over time
so that a society can learn and adapt to the increasing
institutional complexity.
[62] Finally, it is urgently required to conduct research into
the cumulative effect of the distributed option, wherebymany
cascading tanks and small reservoirs are littered across
watersheds, both in terms of hydrology and governance.
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